. 



THE BLACK WARRIOR AFFAIR 



HENRY L. JANES 



REPRINTED FROM THE 



gwmaw primal §mm 



VOL. XII., NO. 2 



JANUARY, 1907 



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[Reprinted from ThkAmkrican Historical Review, Vol. XII., No. 2, Jan., 1907.] 



THE BLACK WARRIOR AFFAIR 

The affair of the Black Warrior was symptomatic of the political 
conditions of its time in the United States. It may perhaps be 
treated as a type of the many disputes which arose during the last 
century over the peculiarly Spanish methods of applying the navi- 
gation laws of Cuba to our shipping. It brings us into contact with 
• the Spanish administration of Cuba in the days of an international 
crisis. But the various accounts of the affair that have already 
been written are based in all the essential points upon such docu- 
ments and diplomatic and private papers as have been given to the 
government printers for publication by the Department of State. 1 
As this material has for the most part consisted of reports and corre- 
spondence of American origin, the" evidence deduced from it in 
arriving at a judgment on the real merits of the case presented by 
the parties involved is unsatisfactory, and the data furnished by it 
have in many particulars remained incomplete. 

An examination of the letter-files of the captain-general of Cuba 
preserved in the Archivo Nacional at Havana has brought to light 
many new papers which shed new light upon this historical incident. 
The Spanish documents bearing on the subject are supplemented 
by the correspondence, official and private, of Americans residing 
in Havana who played important roles in the affair. We now have 
at hand probably the most important official notes that passed be- 
tween Madrid, Havana, and Washington, confidential correspond- 
ence (sometimes carried on in the Spanish government's cipher 
code), which constitutes a very interesting commentary not only on 
the internal politics of the country, but on the main part of the 
foreign policy of the Pierce administration and the attitude of the 
European powers toward the ambitions of the latter. 

This present account does not purport to be a complete story 
of the Black Warrior Affair; it merely attempts to avail itself of 
certain new matter in order to fit some missing historical passages 
into an existing fragmentary account. With these prefatory re- 
marks, we pass on to a review and consideration of the important 
events which occurred at Havana during the months of February, 

'Serial 724, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., Executive Documents, vol. 11, 1853-1854, no. 
86, pp. 306-318; Serial 790, 33 Cong., 2 Sess., Ex. Docs., vol. 10, 1854-1855, 
no. 93. 

(2S0) 



28 1 H. L. Janes 

March, and April of 1854 when the situation known as the Black 
Warrior Affair was developed. 

I. 

The American steamer Black Warrior, one of the largest vessels 
•engaged in the Atlantic coast transportation trade at the time, had 
for many months previous to February, 1854, been calling at 
Havana on her way to Mobile and New York City without partic- 
ular incident. Though more than thirty trips between New York 
and Mobile via -Havana had been made by the steamer, shipments 
not billed to Cuba had never been entered in the manifest of the 
cargo, if we are to accept as worthy of full credence the statement 
of Tyng and Company, consignees of the vessel. The port regula- 
tions of Havana, however, were explicit on this point: all cargo, 
whatever might be its point of destination, must under the law be 
declared in the ship's manifest and pay into the royal treasury a sum 
fixed by law. 

On the morning of February 28, 1854, the Black Warrior, with 
upwards of nine hundred bales of cotton for New York and four- 
teen passengers, passed Morro Castle and anchored in the bay be- 
yond. The vessel was late in arriving. She had been expected 
on the twenty-fifth and had been " cleared " for the day following. 
The company's agents were in the habit of applying for clearance 
papers before the arrival of the steamer in order to have done with 
a formality which might develop into a source of delay if post- 
poned. This very obvious irregularity was sanctioned by the 
Spanish officials. 

The visita de fondeo (visit of inspection) was made in the usual 
manner by the revenue inspectors, who at the time placed in the 
hands of Captain Bullock an English copy of the regulations of the 
port. 1 Revenue Inspector de Santiago, who was accompanied by 
the government interpreter, happened to glance into the open hatches 
of the vessel and discovered that a great quantity of cotton was 
being carried, although the ship's manifest made declaration of noth- 
ing but " ship's stores ". 

In this " heyday of filibusters " the greatest vigilance was en- 
joined on all Spanish officials : Pezuela, the new governor, who had 
been sent to Cuba because of his well-known energetic character, 
had undoubtedly been sufficiently warned by the feverish activities 
of certain adventurers in the States to take every precaution to guard 
the coasts and ports committed to his charge. De Santiago told 

1 Sworn statement of Jaime de Santiago, June 17, 1854. 



The Black Warrior Affair 282 

Captain Bullock that he had twelve hours in which to correct his 
papers, but that in the meantime the discovery that had been made 
would have to be reported to the collector of the customs. The 
captain retorted that, as the goods were on their way to New York, 
Havana had no interest in them ; whereupon he was informed " that 
the bales that he was carrying should be declared in transitu, accord- 
ing to the customs regulations, which he must be well acquainted 
with inasmuch as he came frequently to the port." ' It was bruited 
about that the captain had aboard a cargo of contraband. 2 

At twelve o'clock on this same day, Tyng, the ship's agent, sent 
his clerk to th'e customs office with orders to secure a pass for Morro 
Castle so that the steamer might resume its northern journey. He 
was then told that the vessel was under suspicion. Roca, the col- 
lector, states that he sent a message immediately after the visit of 
de Santiago to the ship apprising Tyng and Company of the turn 
affairs had taken. A second visit of inspection was commanded 
in order to ascertain the correctness of the report of de Santiago; 
and the pass requested was refused pending the result of the re- 
examination of the hold of the steamer. Of course an enormous 
unmanifested cargo was found on board the Black Warrior. When 
the second official visit was paid to the vessel, Roca, after consulting 
with his superior officer, the intendente, and upon Tyng's refusing 
to go on the captain's bond, ordered the immediate seizure of the 
cargo and the arrest of the captain. Roca was careful to stipulate 
" that this [discharge of the ship's cargo] should proceed with the 
despatch that the case required in order that the said boat might 
suffer no delay ". All this occurred before four o'clock in the 
afternoon of the day of the arrival of the steamer. 8 

Tyng now hurried to the consulate of the United States, which 
was at the time in charge of Acting Consul William H. Robertson. 
This official showed an activity all through the affair which the 
Spaniards characterized in very severe terms and which won for 
him the cordial dislike of the authorities of the country. The gov- 
ernor looked upon him as the type of the objectionable American 

1 Ibid. 

2 Justo Zaragoza, Las Insurrecciones en Cuba : Apatites para la Historia 
Politico de esta Isla en el presente Siglo (Madrid, 2 vols., 1872-1873), I. 660; 
Miguel Estorch, Apuntes para la Historia sobre la Administracion del Marques 
de la Pezuela en la Isla de Cuba, desde 3 de diciembre de 1853 hasta 21 de 
setiembre de 1854 (Madrid, 1856), p. 46. 

3 Roca to the General Administrator of the Royal Customs of Havana (t. e., 
the Marques de la Pezuela himself), signed at four o'clock in the afternoon, 
February 28. 1854. 



283 H. L.Janes 

and as the fomenter of all the troubles that so complicated the 
affair of the Black Warrior. 

It was decided at the consulate that the consul and Captain Bul- 
lock should proceed to the palace for the purpose of explaining to 
the governor-general that if an error had been committed it was 
due to the ignorance of the captain of the vessel, who had no knowl- 
edge of the port regulations, and that there had been no attempt 
to defraud the royal exchequer of a portion of its revenues. In 
the meantime Tyng was to call at the custom-house and lay his case 
before the collector of customs. Tyng alleges that the collector 
refused "offhand" (estempordnco) to permit him to correct the 
manifest, declaring that the right of correction ceased at the moment 
of the presentation of the paper. Bullock says he learned, to his 
surprise, that this right had been lost when the clearance papers 
had been issued, that is, two days before the steamer reached 
Havana. 

To the assertion of the Americans that the captain had followed 
all the formalities that had been observed in all the many previous 
trips of the vessel to Havana, Estorch, the historian of Pezuela's ad- 
ministration, interposes the rejoinder that there is record of at 
least one case where the captain of the Black Warrior had presented 
the proper legal manifest and where duties on merchandise in transit 
aboard the vessel had been collected. The very nice point that a 
practice long continued could crystallize into a custom which might 
acquire the real force of law and be entitled to all respect as such, 
and that the sudden enforcement of an obsolete law in opposition to 
custom might seriously demoralize commerce and work damage for 
which an indemnity could be exacted, was carefully passed over 
by the Spanish authorities. This question was a matter for the 
equitable jurisdiction of Her Majesty. It was fully debated in the 
Cortes a year later. From the Spanish standpoint, it was quite 
sufficient to interpose at this point that the governor of Cuba was 
sent to his high post for the purpose of enforcing the law. As to 
previous arrangements and practices, Roca, 1 who had just been 
appointed collector of customs of the port of Havana, could hardly 
have been expected to take cognizance of irregular agreements made 
before his appointment ; it was his duty to compel the shipping of 
the port to conform to the instructions which were placed in his 
hands at the time of the assumption of his new charge. 

It is worthy of note that none of the Spanish documents at hand, 
bearing dates showing that they were written within two or three 

'Estorch, Apuntes, p. 70. 

AM. HIST. REV., VOL. XII. 1 9. 



The Black Warrior Affair 284 

weeks after the detention of the Black Warrior, contains anything 
regarding the twelve-hour rule which soon came forward as the 
point about which the most heated discussion raged. Did the 
Havana authorities deny to the American citizens on this occasion 
the legal right they possessed of modifying or correcting the ship's 
manifest as they pleased within the period of twelve hours after 
the arrival of the vessel ? This point is an all-important one. On 
June 17 Roca, in obedience to orders from the captain-general (who 
acted on a suggestion made by the Spanish legation at Washington), 
subscribed to a sworn statement which gave in his words what trans- 
pired during the visit of Tyng to him on the afternoon of February 
28. This affidavit of Roca's will repay careful examination ; for Marcy 
was very insistent on the point that the whole success of the Spanish 
defense depended on whether they could show that the cargo of the 
Black Warrior was not embargoed before seven o'clock p. m. of the 
twenty-eighth, or twelve hours after the boat had dropped anchor 
near the coal-wharves of Havana. The Roca-Tyng conference took 
place between the hours of three and four. Roca states that he 
directed Tyng's attention 

to the fact that he might, if he pleased, with the view of obviating difficul- 
ties and guarding against disagreeable possibilities, make an addition to 
or correction of the manifest, declaring as in transitu the merchandise 
which was on board said vessel ; that the instructions gave the captain 
(or, in case of his failure to act, the consignee of the boat) this privilege 
in the fifth article ; that the period was twelve working [utiles] hours ; 
and that he had yet time, as the period did not expire until six o'clock 
that evening. 

Roca states that Tyng had nothing but stubborn remonstrances to 
offer at this point. The affidavit continues : 

The said Tyng replied as follows to this : that " he would not submit 
to ridiculous formalities, that the cotton and other cargo on board the 
steamer Black Warrior was on its way to another point, and that, as far 
as Havana was concerned, the boat rode in ballast, as its manifest said " ; 
and, taking out his watch and looking at the hour, he added, " what I 
do, is to protest before you that this was said at 3 130 in the afternoon " 
— to which he that subscribes this replied, that he [Tyng] ought not to 
protest regarding what the " Instruction " prescribed in the case and 
that he [Tyng] might protest against it before his [Roca's] superior 
officers, if he believed that he [Roca] was failing to perform his duty. 

According to" this statement of Roca, the afternoon's representa- 
tions of Tyng degenerated at this crucial moment into angry pro- 
tests against " ridiculous formalities " of the law instead of taking 
the form of an application for permission to correct the manifest 
that had been presented. The collector on oath further declares 



285 H. L.Janes 

that it was not until the following day that the consignee was ready 
to present the formal petition which was required. A few days 
later, Tyng had a conference with the governor-general, who re- 
ports it in his despatches to Washington and Madrid in these words •} 

. . . the consignee called upon me, openly confessing their [Captain 
Bullock's and Tyng's] fault, attributing it to their ignorance, and re- 
questing of me as an act of clemency that no higher duties be exacted 
than those paid by every boat having cargo manifested as in transitu ; 
but I did not consider it proper to accede to this request out of respect 
for the law and the national dignity and for the additional reason that, 
as judicial proceedings had been instituted, it was not in my power to 
take the step suggested, and furthermore and chiefly because, bearing in 
mind the circumstances that a sheet of [special] instructions together 
with a [complete] copy (in English) of the same had been placed in the 
hands of the captain, a plea of ignorance of customs and language could 
not be entertained. 

Roca's statement was made some four and one-half months after 
February 28, and much had occurred during that interval to stir the 
Spanish administration to a realization of the gravity of the inter- 
national situation. Bearing in mind the advice that (if we are to 
believe the affidavit of June 17) was given to Tyng by Roca, the 
following extract quoted from a letter 2 written by the same official 
a few minutes after the visit of Tyng, and in reply to a note ad- 
dressed to him by the captain-general, is interesting : " Therefore, 
I have given orders to the ' Comandante de Carabineros ' to begin 
the unloading of the effects that have been confiscated, and to store 
them in the warehouses of Casa Blanca, charging him especially and 
repeatedly to use all moderation in everything." The date of this 
order is not doubtful : " This is all that I am able to say to Your 
Excellency in reply to your official note of to-day which I just at 
this moment received, which is four o'clock in the afternoon. . . . 
Havana, February 28, 1854. Your Excellency, Joaqn. Roca." If 
Tyng still had several hours at his disposal during- which he could 
bring the ship's papers into conformity with the law (as the above 
affidavit would indicate), the immediate seizure of the property by 
the collector was absolutely without any moral or legal justification, 
an outrage committed against the property of American citizens, 
aggravated by the mala fides of the collector of the port who issued 
the order of detention and confiscation. 

Pezuela 3 advises Cueto, the Spanish minister at Washington, on 
the twentieth of the following June that the means indicated by 

1 Pezuela to Calderon and Magallon, March 7, 1854. 

2 Roca to Pezuela, February 28, 1854. 

3 Pezuela to Cueto, June 20, 1854 (rough draft). 



The Black Warrior .Affair 286 

Roca as an escape from his "precarious position" was really (as 
he puts it) " evasive " ; for Captain Bullock could not properly claim 
the legal privilege of modifying the manifest presented. The law 
in question, he goes on to say, applied only to the person " who had 
presented said manifest of cargo ", permitting this individual to 
correct a mistake that had inadvertently crept into the paper, but 
not giving such permission to a person who, like Captain Bullock, 
did not present any manifest of cargo at all, and " committed a 
deliberate error for the purpose of defrauding the royal revenues by 
making a declaration in ballast when such was not the fact." This 
argument comes forward rather tardily, but Pezuela evidently 
cherished the hope that Roca's suggestion viewed in this light might 
gain a superior force, evidencing the eagerness of the Spanish offi- 
cials to render every aid to the American merchants in finding a 
way through the labyrinth of Spanish law to a method of escaping 
the heavy penalty that was impending. 

The Washington despatches dated May 7 and June 7 fix the 
crux of the difficulty in this fashion : l 

The successful issue of the negotiation regarding the affair of the 
Black Warrior, torpified at present by this circumstance [the difficulty 
of reconciling the conflicting statements of the officials of the two nations 
in Havana], depends solely for us on the possibility of demonstrating 
the palpable and complete inexactitude of the assertion 2 of Mr. 
Robertson. 

Cueto was not slow in detecting the weak point in the governor's 
defense. With the record of the period before us, we can appreciate 
the force of added pressure which despatches of the above nature 
from Washington must have had on Pezuela, who through Roca had 
been fully advised on February 28 of the steps that had been taken 
that day in the matter of the seizure of the cotton aboard the Amer- 
ican steamer. Every bit of evidence goes to establish the belief that 
Her Catholic Majesty's representative in the " ever most faithful 
City of Havana " was not at that time unwilling to avail himself 
of the administrative privilege of prevarication. 

With the above facts clearly established, the suspicion gains 
strength that Havana was trying to make our consul a scapegoat 
for Spanish aims. It was felt in Spanish official circles that some- 
thing must be done to correct the impression that Robertson"s official 
reports were giving. Pezuela, pressed hard for facts, maintained 
that " our government should protest immediately against the asser- 

1 Cueto to Pezuela, May 7, 1854. 

2 That is, that the vessel and cargo had been seized by the authorities of 
Havana before the much-discussed legal period of twelve hours had run. 



287 H. L. Janes 

tions that the consul Robertson has made or may in the future make, 
as I consider him to be the prime cause of the strained relations at 
present existing between the two governments ". 1 Occasionally the 
personal hostility of the two officials finds expression in the notes 
exchanged by the Consulate and the Palace. In the hurry of the 
moment Robertson had neglected to take a copy of the first letter 2 
to Pezuela relating to the detention of the Black Warrior, and so 
respectfully requested that a copy of the original in the hands of 
the governor might be made for the files of the consulate. The 
note from the secretary of the governor accompanying the copy of 
the letter indicated remarked insinuatingly that the Marques de la 
Pezuela was a gentleman and for his part had nothing to conceal. 
He probably adverted to Robertson's failure to transmit a copy of 
the letter of February 28 to the Department at Washington. Then 
came the articles in the Diario de la Marina, the official paper, sav- 
agely attacking the consul and the head of the government he repre- 
sented. Robertson in both cases 3 criticized the translations that 
had been made of a consular despatch and the President's message 
— translations that were so bad as to be vicious — qualifying the 
philippic directed against him as actuated by malice and as showing 
a clear intent to pervert the facts. He even went to the length of 
demanding that the objectionable passages in the articles he named 
be corrected in a manner honorable to himself. The important part 
of the governor's reply in the formal third person follows : 4 

That he [Pezuela] has considered as official all communications that 
Your Honor has addressed to him, not having had at any time motive to 
act otherwise; that henceforth you may abstain from directing to His 
Excellency complaints foreign to the exclusively commercial character 
of the exequatur (which Your Honor may please to reread at this point) 
granted to Your Honor by the Queen, My Lady; that there is no repre- 
sentation here recognized by the States of the Union as having such 
privileges, and Your Honor may turn with your grievances to your 
government as this government may turn to its own or to our representa- 
tive at Washington, when it may be necessary. 

The governor promised, however, to have certain of the correc- 
tions desired made. Pezuela in his secret despatches accuses Robert- 
son of improperly and clandestinely interfering in the affairs of the 
country. He declares that Robertson permitted the captain of the 
Fulton to vaunt in his house the mad purpose " of taking the Black 

1 Pezuela to Cueto, June 20, 1854. 

2 A letter that was a purely formal protest against the proceedings of the 
Spaniards as to the Black Warrior. 

3 Robertson to Pezuela (2), April 1, 1854. 

1 Secretary of Government to Robertson, April 2, 1854. 



The Black Warrior Affair 2 88 

Warrior out of the port by force ", and that the consul " made ex- 
aggerated and erroneous reports to Washington which prompted 
the President's message out of which arose all the present inter- 
national difficulties ". 1 

The very fact that inadequate powers were granted our consular 
representatives in Havana was the direct cause of endless friction 
between the consulate and the government of the island. It was 
inevitable that our consuls should quickly fall into bad repute with 
the Spanish authorities of Cuba and be arraigned as officious inter- 
meddlers, if they were to be of any service to the Americans who 
were constantly falling victims to incomprehensible formalities or 
to the principle of dolce far niente of the island administration. An 
increase in the powers of the consul which would give him a semi- 
diplomatic character would have harmonized well with the viceregal 
prerogatives of a governor of the time of Pezuela. 2 

Coming back to the original facts of the case, nothing could 
prevent the embargo from being laid on the vessel. On March 2 
Charles Tyng and Company petitioned the captain-general, acknowl- 
edging that " they had erred through pure ignorance, but without 
the slightest intention of causing loss to the Royal Treasury or of 
creating difficulties ". 3 A petition drawn up on the previous day had 
stated that, during the course of many trips from Mobile to New 
York, the agents had always omitted to make declaration of cargo 
in transit as it had been taken for granted that this was the proper 
thing to do. This objectionable phraseology was not repeated in 
the formal petition of March 2, probably in obedience to a sugges- 
tion from high quarters. On March 7 the Diario de la Marina pub- 
lished a decree which had gone into effect on the twenty-third of 
the previous month. This decree declared that a manifest once 
modified in any way was final and could not be allowed in any 
particular ; it is extremely doubtful whether this order, which had 
been published weeks after the confiscation complained of, was law 
on February 28. On March 16 the vessel and cargo were released 
and a fine of $6,000 imposed on the agents, Tyng and Company, in 
lieu of all other punishment. 5 The captain-general agreed to per- 
mit a petition to be transmitted through him to the Queen. This 
petition was favorably received by the home government, Her 
Catholic Majesty deigning to remit the fine of 6,000 duros and to 

1 Pezuela to Cueto, June 20, 1854. 

2 Zaragoza, Las Insurrecciones , I. 654. 

3 Estorch, Apuntes, pp. 174-176. 

4 Serial 790, 33 Cong., 2 Sess., Ex. Doc. 93, p. 46. 

5 Pezuela to Magallon, March 21, 1854; Estorch, Apuntes, p. 176. 



289 H. L. Janes 

grant, with generosity becoming royalty, customs privileges similar 
to those enjoyed by the ships of the English Royal Mail Line. 

In the course of the next twelve months America heard little of 
the Black Warrior affair. During the vernal months of the follow- 
ing year the matter of indemnity to the owners of the Black Warrior 
had reached the stage of discussion in the stormy sessions of the 
Cortes. The American claimants received ministerial support in 
the persons of Luzuriaga and Zabala. It was freely acknowledged 
that the practice observed by Tyng of not declaring goods billed 
to New York or Mobile had " converted itself into a species of cus- 
tom, constituting almost a law for the master of the steamer who 
felt sure that, if he declared the steamer to be in ballast, no inspec- 
tion would be made, and this was done with the advice (anuncio) 
and consent of the authorities "- 1 The official gazette of Madrid 2 
observed that the authorities could not accept the refusal of Captain 
Bullock to amend the ship's manifest at two or three o'clock as a 
formal and effective renunciation of a right which the law gave to 
third parties for the space of twelve hours after the arrival of the 
boat. 

A document discovered among the papers submitted by Pezuela 3 
showed that twelve hours had not elapsed from the time of the 
arrival of the steamer to the moment of the imposition of the em- 
bargo. In the fact that the Black Warrior carried mail the Spanish 
ministers found justification for the novel method pursued by the 
house of Tyng for the purpose of obtaining clearance papers for a 
vessel that had not yet reached port. In accordance with the recom- 
mendations of the Cabinet, the owners of the Black Warrior were 
granted an indemnity of $53,000, thus putting a last touch to the 
complete triumph of the American case and severely censuring the 
administration of the Marques de la Pezuela, who had been recalled 
in the autumn of the previous year. 

II. 

The difficulties of communication with Cuba and the inevitable 
delays of distance were eagerly seized upon by Madrid as excuses 
for what might be properly called administrative procrastination, 
whenever it was feared that an affair might take a turn prejudicial 

1 Diario de las Sesiones, P. 8944 (1S55) ; ibid., March 29, 1855. 

2 Gaceta de Madrid, December 6, 1854. 

3 Ibid. 

* On May 3, 1835, the Minister of State said in the Cortes: "It gives me 
pleasure to inform the Cortes that the Black Warrior affair has been concluded 
and the feeling of common accord re-established between the two governments." 



The Black Warrior Affair 290 

to the royal exchequer and disagreeable to Her Catholic Majesty. 
The opportunities presented by the nature of the respective positions 
on the map of colony and mother-country for delaying practically 
at will the settlement of claims of Cuban origin against the Spanish 
government were almost always too tempting to be neglected by 
Spanish statesmen. A protest handed by our consul in Havana to 
the captain-general was referred to Washington, which informed 
Madrid. Madrid must await a direct report from Havana before 
it could consent to take up a discussion of the case. Regarding the 
particular case we have in hand, however, Spanish diplomacy acted 
with unwonted despatch and incisiveness. On the seventh day of 
March, 1854, when for the first time it appeared certain that the 
Black Warrior affair would come into the international arena, the 
captain-general transmitted official accounts of the seizure of the 
vessel and cargo to Spain and to the Spanish charge at Washington, 
who almost immediately on receipt of the Havana correspondence 
reported to his government on the general political situation in the 
United States. 

No one has sought to palliate the extraordinary conduct of our 
representative at the court of Madrid during the course of this affair. 
Soule was ambitiously exceeding his instructions and busily antagon- 
izing colleagues and government at Spain's capital. In his eager- 
ness to force a war and so wrest from Spain the possession of the 
Pearl of the Antilles, he was advancing claims and preferring 
charges of such stupendous magnitude that no government could 
in justice to itself think of entering into a discussion of the matter 
without being in possession of unusually full official information. 
Calderon de la Barca's appreciation of this situation is embodied in 
the instructions transmitted to Magallon on April 13 : the Spanish 
Secretary of State describes the expectant attitude of the Spanish 
government ; and it may be said, by way of introduction to the 
passage we quote, that Pezuela's first despatch of March 7 was to 
be continued by another prepared in time to catch the next monthly 
steamer, so that a complete report of the proceedings in Havana 
could have reached the Spanish Department of State only late in the 
month of April ■} 

This government has not refused, as Your Excellency will see, nor 
does it refuse in this nor in any other case, to fulfil the obligations that 
are imposed by international law and by justice. But to accede without 
further investigation and with unseemly haste to the extraordinary de- 
mands of Mr. Soule, presented in these solemn days 2 in a manner so 

'Calderon to Pezuela, April 13, 1854. 
2 The Lenten festival in Catholic Spain. 



-29 1 H. L. Janes 

unusual in transactions of this kind between friendly nations, would be 
derogatory to the dignity of an independent government, would be an 
act of arbitrariness against authorities in whom Her Majesty reposes 
Tier confidence. It is the duty of the government to hear and to take 
under careful consideration what the latter may adduce in their defense, 
and not to pass judgment hurriedly upon the presentation of evidence by 
the interested and irritated party alone. 

The most elementary notions of justice could not be content with 
less. Authentic and complete data from Havana were indispensable 
to the formation of a correct and equitable judgment in the case. 

During the time of his residence as Spanish minister in Wash- 
ington Calderon, the Spanish Secretary of State, had had ample 
opportunity to gain a thorough acquaintance with the leading traits 
of American character and to obtain a more than superficial knowl- 
edge of the problems with which the leading parties were grappling. 
He at once realized the peculiar significance of the present affair, 
which bade fair to bring on all kinds of complications. All the 
instructions which he issued to his subordinates are couched in terms 
that are both firm and conservative. He saw clearly that certain 
factions in the States would welcome a war with Spain, and that 
the most exquisite tact would be required on the part of the repre- 
sentatives of his country to avoid a terrible international collision 
and gain a delay during which the excited passions of the hotheads 
in the Union might have time to cool. He was ready to act on a 
suggestion that the whole matter be submitted for arbitration to 
some friendly power, and was first to point to this way out of the 
difficulty. 

Two despatches in cipher soon arrived from Washington bearing 
startling news of the sensation created throughout the length and 
breadth of the Union by the detention of the Black Warrior. The 
tone of the press and the attitude of the leading members of the 
Cabinet were unmistakably bellicose. The possibilities of the situa- 
tion were discussed by the Spanish charge d'affaires at Washington, 
who expressed the opinion " that internal questions have so divided 
the Democratic party that it will not be strange if this government 
utilizes this or any other excuse to create a national question, with 
the purpose of uniting the party upon it ". 1 

Was that volcano of American politics now to break out in an 
eruption that would destroy the last vestige of Spanish sovereignty 
in the West Indies? This was a question which editors were in- 
clined to answer affirmatively and diplomats to discuss with fore- 

1 Magallon to Pezuela (inclosing' Magallon to Spanish Secretary of State. 
March 20, 1854), March 22, 1854. 



The Black Warrior Affair 292 

boding. The foreign representatives at Washington were fully 
alive to the gravity of the situation. England and France were 
quite sure to be behind Spain with their advice and encouragement, 
and the other powers followed their lead. 

Secretary Marcy and President Pierce were known to be greatly 
incensed over the affair, and it was apparent to every one at the 
nation's capital that strong pressure by powerful influences was 
being brought to bear on the President in the effort to raise the 
incident to the dignity of a casus belli. The general situation has 
an additional interest if told in the words of the Spanish charge ; the 
essential portions of the confidential cipher despatches are here in- 
serted in translation : : 

As soon as the news of the detention of said steamer by the authori- 
ties of Cuba reached this point by telegraph from Charleston, the press 
broke out in diatribes against the government of Cuba and that of Her 
Majesty, each of the editors proposing a mode of avenging the so-called 
outrage ; only the chivalric and independent " Intelligencer " and one 
other sheet counselled moderation and an impartial investigation of the 
matter before passing judgment upon it. A representative in the House 
proposed the suspension of the laws of neutrality as regards Spain ; this 
proposition was rejected. On the following day another moved that the 
President be requested to transmit to the House the official correspond- 
ence relating to the affair. This was approved, and in conformity 
therewith the President yesterday transmitted to the House the inclosed 
message, regarding which I believe I may be excused from making any 
commentary, as up to this time I have been able to study only the portion 
furnished by the American acting-consul in Havana, whose report is for 
the most part founded upon suppositions. The agents [Tyng and Com- 
pany], however, state that they have been guided in everything by the 
counsel of this consular agent. I beg to advise Your Excellency that 
illusory hopes should not be built on this particular. From the Presi- 
dent down, all are disposed to take advantage of any opportunity to get 
possession of Cuba, whether it baby attacking the island directly or by 
lending aid to the revolutionaries. The situation in the Orient they 
believe to be as favorable to this as they have for some time desired ; and 
they will have it understood that the preoccupation of France and Eng- 
land in those regions will prevent these nations from lending aid to us 
and that they [the Americans] can work more freely. 

If I had no other reasons in support of this statement of mine than 
the above, those which I now communicate to Your Excellency would 
suffice. On the occasion of the visit of the minister of England to the 
Department of State, when the minister asked Mr. Marcy whether in the 
case of the cessation of hostilities with Russia, and in case the vessels 
of H. B. M. should seize any American privateer [or as the Spanish has 
it, corsair~\, the law of the United States would be applied to the latter, 
Mr. Marcy replied in the affirmative; and added, as in jest, that England 
and France would in this respect be so satisfied with this . government 

1 Magallon to Pezuela, partly in cipher (transmitting Magallon to First Secre- 
tary of State, March 16, 1854), March 20, 1854. 



293 H- L. Janes 

that he hoped that said powers would put no obstacles in the way of the 
annexation of the island. When the astute General Almonte, on the 
other hand, tried to convince Mr. Marcy that the modification of the 
article of the treaty just negotiated with Mexico, in which the United 
States engaged itself to employ its army and marine in the destruction 
of whatever filibustering expedition might take up arms against that 
republic, deprived Mexico of one of the most important bases of said 
treaty, he [Mr. Marcy] responded to him in these words : the concession 
would mean nothing to Your Excellency but would tie our hands in the 
question of Cuba ; this in spite of the assurances given in the message of 
the President at the opening of the last Congress ! The minister of 
Mexico assured me yesterday that a person who was present when the 
President received the first news of the embargo placed on the Black 
Warrior told him that he [the President], rubbing his 'palms together, 
exclaimed : " Good, good. Here is a fine bit of political capital ! " 

A note of March 20 continues the above i 1 

The minister of France told me that he had had a long conference 
with the Minister of State, in which he had tried to convince the latter 
that the case of the Black Warrior was a purely commercial question 
and not a political question as they are trying to make it, reminding him 
that not long since the collector of customs of California, in contraven- 
tion of the laws of the United States, had detained and sold at public 
auction several English and from thirteen to seventeen French vessels, 
without this having altered the relations of France and England with 
this country. The Minister of State persisted in asserting that the alleged 
outrage had been committed with the express purpose of offending 
this republic and its government, and told the French minister that at 
any rate his instructions had already been issued and the message of 
the President transmitted to the House. The Count de Sartiges said to 
him then that he was certain that his government as well as that of Eng- 
land could not look with indifference upon any attack on the integrity 
of Cuba, and that they would maintain the principles advanced in theii 
project of the Tripartite Treaty. As it was rumored with some appear- 
ance of truth that this Congress of Representatives [sic'] would vote the 
suspension with respect to Spain of the laws of neutrality of 1818, 2 the 
minister resident of Bremen went to see Mr. Mann, Sub-secretary of 
State, and in confidence protested against that proposed measure, alleg- 
ing that not only our commerce but the commerce of all other nations, 
including his own, would suffer thereby. To this Mr. Mann replied 
that those who broke the law in its application to other countries would 
be punished, but that he believed that the government really wished to 
obtain this authorization from Congress. Then the minister resident 
pointed out the impossibility of punishing those acts of piracy, owing 
to the fact that it was impossible to bring forward witnesses against the 
offenders, as the vessels seized were sunk after being robbed. At the 
conclusion of his conference with Mr. Mann he came to inform me 
regarding it. Finally the present charge d'affaires of Russia, a friend 
and old comrade of mine, told me that he had found Mr. Marcy much 

1 Magallon to Pezuela (transmitting Magallon to the First Secretary of State 
of Spain, March 20, 1854), March 22, 1854. 

2 See United States Statutes at Large, III. 447—450. 



The Black Warrior Affair 294 

incensed, and that Marcy assured him that if he had had the available 
vessels he would have sent them to Havana; but that they were going 
to summon the squadron which they had in Japan, for this purpose as 
well as in view of what might possibly occur. The message of the 
President is still under consideration in the Committee of Foreign 
Affairs of the House; but from a short speech that its chairman, Mr. 
Bayley, made in reply to a question, the report of the committee will not 
in the slightest degree depart from the tone of virulence of said message. 

The probable alignment of the powers, in the event that America 
dealt the stroke that was to cut the Gordian Knot and bring on the 
war, was of the greatest interest. Direct word had reached Madrid 
that Spain's old friends would stand by her in this crisis to the end. 
" From communications that we have received from London and 
Paris ", wrote Calderon, 1 " we learn with satisfaction that the 
Cabinets of France and England approve our course and are of the 
opinion that justice is on our side." On the day following the 
despatch of this, Her Majesty's representatives in the New World 
were informed that the hint had been dropped at the courts of Paris 
and London that the Queen of Spain would not look with disfavor 
upon any proposition that might be made to arbitrate the whole 
question. 

All the news that reached Madrid from Washington, however, 
was far from being reassuring ; the hopes that were felt at first of 
an early settlement gave place to a feeling of pessimism regarding 
the outcome. As to an amicable adjustment of the difference at 
an early date, the Spanish diplomats at Paris and London were in- 
formed " that, unfortunately, there are motives not unknown to you 
which would prevent the government of Her Majesty from placing 
too many hopes on the certainty of such a termination ". 2 Calderon, 
who, as has been said, had passed a period of diplomatic service in 
Washington, could not be altogether certain that the clouds that 
seemed to be hovering over Cuba's coasts were not those of war. 
He knew that many persons were ready to applaud such sentiments 
as those which proceeded from the editorial columns of the Union, 
a paper which was looked upon as most certainly voicing the views 
of the administration. This paper declared that the time had 
arrived when we must meet Spain in Cuba with " the purse in one 
hand and the sword in the other ". 3 Shortly after the first news 
from Havana reached the public, the New York Herald thus har- 
angued its readers : 

1 Calderon to Pezuela, May 7. 1854. 

2 Same to same, May 8, 1854. 

3 Washington Daily Union, June 23, 1854; quoted in letter of Cueto to the 
Spanish First Secretary of State, June 24, 1854. 



295 H- L.Janes 

If the administration have any heart left, if there be among them one 
spark of American spirit, let them take up this matter in the tone which 
befits the gravity of the case, and the chronic character of the Cuban dis- 
ease. No ambassadors, or diplomatic notes are needed. Let them 
simply fit out, in a week at farthest, three or four war steamers, and 
despatch them to Cuba, with peremptory orders to obtain satisfaction 
for the injury done to the Black Warrior. Let Governor Pezuela be 
allowed twenty-four hours to release the cargo of the steamer, and make 
full compensation to the owners, and in default, we shall see whether 
our navy contains but one Ingraham. 1 

That the Spanish authorities of Cuba had had no intention of 
insulting the American flag was of course carefully emphasized by 
Cueto. 2 The Spanish premier characterized the affair as an incident 
which, 

exploited by malice and by the spirit of hostility to Spain which is 
fostered by certain evil-intentioned parties, assumed an importance 
which it could never have had, had it been investigated in the beginning 
with cool deliberation, and had an attentive ear not been turned to the 
impassioned reports of those who sought to pass as the aggrieved parties 
and to exaggerate the extent of their injuries. 

At Madrid, Soule was beginning to become more moderate in 
his behavior and showed himself hopefully tractable in a conference 
with San Luis, the president of the Council of Ministers. The 
time had arrived, it was thought in Spanish circles, when Cueto 
might be instructed to lay stress upon the well-known fact of the 
almost brutal insistence of the American claimants and the gen- 
erosity and fairness of Her Majesty's government. Cueto was in- 
structed to make a direct appeal 3 to the President's sense of justice 
and to prevail upon him and Marcy to lay the vexed question for- 
ever aside. i Though the release of the steamer Black Warrior, the 
remittal of the fine, and the grant of special royal privileges to the 
owners of the boat put the minister at a loss to imagine any pos- 
sible point d'appui in reason for new claims, it was recognized that 
the general situation was far from being reassuring. Quitman in the 
South 5 and Slidell in Congress might be successful in their purposes. 
What then ? All possible contingencies must be carefully considered. 

If passion prevails against reason [came the word from the old 
Castilian], if the repeated assurances of our purpose and sincere desire 
to preserve peaceful relations with the Republic are vain, Your Excel- 
lency will labor for delay and to obtain the acceptance of arbitration, 
which is the means to which good faith turns and which cannot be 

1 New York Herald, March n, 1854. 

2 Cueto to the Secretary of State, June 24, 1854. 

3 Calderon to Pezuela, May 10, 1854; also Calderon to Cueto, same date. 
* Calderon to Pezuela, May 7, 1854. 

5 Same to same, May 10, 1854. 



The Black Warrior Affair 296 

refused when it is intended to secure a triumph of justice by discover- 
ing the truth. But although Your Excellency is authorized to support 
this idea, this proposition of arbitration, as a last recourse, it should not 
be suggested either verbally or in writing by Your Excellency. There 
is one contingency which, while the government of Her Majesty does 
not look upon it as probable, yet cannot remain unnoticed. I allude to 
the case that the abolition of the law of neutrality should be proposed in 
Congress, or what is substantially the same as the trampling under foot 
of the most sacred precept of the code of nations. If that country 
should bring such a scandal forth into the world, Your Excellency will' 
take measures to prevent the passage of such a resolution. If, upon 
being passed, it is sanctioned by the President, Your Excellency will 
protest against it, representing that Her Majesty will consider it as a 
declaration of war which is most abhorred by all Christendom, the war 
of pirates. Your Excellency will [then] withdraw from Washington 
with the whole legation and send a full report of everything to the 
captain-general of Cuba. Your Excellency will act in a similar manner 
if an expedition of pirates, 1 such as has set out in the past, succeeds in 
leaving for that island, and if it is followed by another, although it may 
be a division of the same expedition. Your Excellency will state that 
war is considered as having been declared, and Your Excellency will', 
advise the captain-general to that effect, in order that he may take the 
proper measures. 2 

The Spanish minister at Washington was admonished to keep 
in constant communication with the captain-general throughout this 
period of crises, and to galvanize into life the torpidity of certain 
consuls of Spain in the States, bringing them to a full realization 
of the necessity of reporting frequently to the legation and of keep- 
ing constantly on the alert. Further, the consuls in the chief cities 
of the States were to be kept an courant of the course of events in 
Havana by Pezuela, as is evidenced by the correspondence at hand. 
Extraordinary powers of removal ad interim of those commercial 
representatives who did not show the requisite official zeal were given 
the minister in this emergency. But the fact was apparent that the 
crisis had already passed. In America a reaction had already begun 
to set in against the undiplomatic and ambitious Soule. The atten- 
tion of the American people was directed westward to the great 
initial manifestations of a hostility which was soon to array one- 
section of the country against the other in civil war. 

Cueto wrote his government on June 7 that the Washington 
Cabinet was trying to extricate itself from the Black Warrior en- 
tanglement. Apropos of the manoeuvre of Soule, 3 which consisted 
in again presenting a mass of accumulated claims of American citi- 

1 Reference is made to filibustering expeditions. 

2 Calderon to Pezuela (Calderon to Cueto, dated the same), May y, 1854. 

3 Soule to Calderon. April 20, 1854, Serial 790, 33 Cong., 2 Sess., Ex. Doc- 
93, P- 77- " 



297 H. L. Janes 

zens and in crowding Spain with demands that the claims be im- 
mediately liquidated, the envoy had this to say ■> 

I do not fear it [a discussion of these claims] at the present time, 
because, as Your Excellency very well knows, these claims have not been 
disinterred by reason of any value which any one of them may in itself 
have, but as a method of procuring pabulum for the execrable system of 
political popularity, which consists in exciting the public opinion in 
'these states against the Spaniards by imaginary grievances. Mr. Soule, 
who shows himself such a stubborn promoter of this system, has lost so 
much of his diplomatic prestige that (I desire to state this in such a 
manner as will leave no room for doubt) this government will not fol- 
low his lead in the matter of the claims referred to; at least, in these 
moments, when the majority of the American people, disgusted with 
the extraordinary demonstration accompanying the presentation of 
groundless claims, and with the incongruous plans of the government, 
and distrusting the latter not a little, are restraining the ebullition of 
anger which was produced in the beginning by the " Black Warrior " 
question. 

The internal strife reached such proportions and so engaged the 
public attention that the Spanish minister was able on the eighth 
of the next month to report that " all the questions promoted by the 
hostile policy of this government against us remain as if paralyzed ; 
the press is silenced, and the affair of the ' Black Warrior ' almost 
forgotten ". 2 

When Cueto in obedience to instructions from home sought an 
interview with Marcy and laid before the secretary the case of his 
government together with the detailed reports from Havana, the 
whole matter had passed into the hands of Congress ; and the De- 
partment of State was able only to transmit to that body such in- 
formation as it received.. The conciliatory note of Calderon, 3 which 
Cueto placed before Marcy and dishing 4 in the original, made a 
deep impression upon the minds of the Cabinet members, who re- 
quested that they might have a copy of the communication. But 
the Spanish diplomat excused himself from this on the ground that 
he would first have to ask permission of his government before he 
could grant this request ; for, as he writes to his superior, in the 
light of past experience he had reason to fear that the official note 
might be given out to the press with the " usual self-laudatory com- 
ments thereon prepared by the administration ". It was quite evi- 
dent from the attitude of the two secretaries that they would will- 
ingly, if they could, close up the whole matter. 

1 Cueto to Calderon, July 4, 1854. 

2 Estorch, Apuntes, p. 52. 

3 Calderon to Cueto, May 7, 1854. 

4 When Cushing learned that Tyng in his petition acknowledged that " the 
Captain had erred ", the attorney-general ejaculated impatiently, " Of that stamp 
are all merchants ". Ibid. 



The Black Warrior Affair 298 

In this interview Marcy carefully sifted the evidence, and ad- 
vanced the opinion that nothing was clear but the fact of a direct 
contradiction in the evidence presented by Pezuela and Robertson, 
respectively, and that there the matter must rest pending the receipt 
of further advices after a fresh investigation. The question regard- 
ing the intent of the Cuban authorities to dishonor our national 
emblem was hardly touched upon; it had been relegated to the 
limbo" of all abortive international charges. 

At length the normal conditions had returned. Spanish diplom- 
acy, aided by its good ally in America, the struggle over the ques- 
tion of the extension of slavery, had won the day against the faction 
who had favored the incorporation of Cuba into the Southern system 
at any price. Fifteen days after the conference between Cueto, 
Marcy, and dishing, Soule received word from the Department of 
State that " The President . . . does not . . . expect you will 
at present take any further steps in relation to the outrage in the 
case of the ' Black Warrior.' ' n 

Henry Lorenzo Janes. - 

'Marcy to Soule, June 22, 1854, Serial 790, 33 Cong., 2 Sess., Ex. Doc. 93, 
p. 117. In his Memories of Many Men, Maunsell B. Field states that after his 
arrival at Madrid with Marcy's despatch relative to the Ostend Manifesto, during 
December, 1854, Soule received instructions to reopen the discussion of the case 
of the Black Warrior with Minister Luzuriaga. 



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